The whole of the Western alliance rests on a single sentence. An attack on one member is an attack on all, and any aggressor who forgets it will find the combined weight of thirty odd nations arrayed against him. For seventy years that promise, written into Article 5 of the NATO treaty, kept the peace in Europe by making the cost of testing it unthinkable. Vladimir Putin has begun, carefully and deliberately, to test it anyway.
He is not doing so with tank columns, at least not yet. The probing is quieter and cleverer than that. Since 2024 Russian drones have drifted into the airspace of a dozen NATO countries, and even neutral Ireland, appearing over airports and military sites before vanishing again. Undersea cables have been cut, railways sabotaged, satellite signals jammed. Each incident on its own is deniable, a malfunction, an accident, the work of unknown hands. Together they form a pattern too consistent to be anything but a campaign.
The purpose of the pinpricks
The point of this harassment is not the damage it does, which is usually modest, but the information it gathers and the fear it spreads. Every drone that crosses a border forces a government to decide whether to shoot it down, scramble jets or say nothing, and every one of those decisions teaches Moscow something about where the alliance is alert and where it is asleep. The incursions map air defences, measure reaction times and test whether NATO's members can coordinate a response or merely trip over one another.
They also work on the mind. A population rattled by mysterious drones and unexplained sabotage grows anxious, and anxious electorates put pressure on governments to avoid provocation, to look away, to hope the trouble passes. That is precisely the reflex Putin wishes to cultivate, because an alliance whose voters have quietly decided that the Baltics are not worth a war is already half defeated before a shot is fired.
The limited attack that could follow
Western intelligence services increasingly fear that the pinpricks are a prelude. American assessments now warn that Putin could, at some point between this autumn and the end of the decade, mount a limited attack on a NATO member, most likely in the Baltics or Poland. The scenario they sketch is not an invasion but something smaller and more insidious, a cyberattack that cripples a city, a brief incursion by unmarked soldiers, a seizure of a sliver of territory, calibrated to fall just below the threshold that would trigger a full allied response.






